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Explanation and Misrepresentation in the Laboratory

Abstract
We report the results of an experiment designed to examine the effect of
opportunity to provide an explanation for inaccurate results and predictability of behavior
on managers’ reporting bias and investors’ ability to decipher the bias. We conduct 20
experimental sessions, each comprised of one manager and three or four investors. The
manager has an incentive, in general, to inflate investors’ expectations and investors have
an incentive to accurately predict value. We find that the manager reports with an
upward bias a majority of the time. The magnitude of the bias, however, is lessened
considerably when the manager’s reporting behavior is unpredictable and the manager
has an opportunity to explain inaccurate (biased) reports. The data suggest that under
such conditions the manager seeks to avoid reporting inaccurately and having to choose
an explanation. We also find that investors adapt to the manager’s behavior and,
strikingly, anticipate that explanation dampens reporting bias.

Keywords: reporting bias, misrepresentation, explanation, investor behavior, earnings
reports, negative emotion

Explanation and Misrepresentation in the Laboratory

1. Introduction
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to examine managers’
reporting behavior and investors’ reaction to such behavior. Research has long
recognized that managers have incentives to report strategically, the purpose being to
shape users’ beliefs of firm performance (e.g., Verrecchia, 2001). In such cases,
managers may not fully reveal private information and earnings reports may be biased.1
Although the accuracy of earnings reports is typically revealed ex post (eventually), the
cause for inaccuracies may be unknown: that is, inaccurate or biased reports may be
attributable to managers’ opportunistic behavior, to circumstances beyond the managers’
control, or to a combination of the two.
In the face of bad news, managers may disclose an explanation for performance
shortcomings to alleviate users’ concern (e.g., Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw,
McKechnie, and Puffer, 1983; Barton and Mercer, 2004). Extant research suggests that
larger companies and companies in less regulated industries are more likely to augment
earnings forecasts with an explanation, particularly for poor forecasts (Baginski, Hassell,
and Kimbrough, 2004). Based on firm characteristics and reporting history, users may
come to expect an explanation for sub-par performance in some cases and not others. We
experimentally investigate whether the opportunity to provide an explanation (allow
versus not allow) affects managers’ behavior in a multi-period setting. The manipulation
permits us to create an environment in which an explanation is expected (allowed) versus
1

Earnings reports are defined broadly and include earnings forecasts and earnings announcements. In
either case, the manager has private information as to future realizations – be it information on the
production function or on the appropriateness of accruals.
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not expected (not allowed). We contend that if an explanation is expected for deviations
in performance, under certain conditions managers are subject to other behavioral
influences, which affect reporting behavior.
A growing literature documents the importance of social preferences in
understanding individual behavior (e.g., Fehr, Fischbacher, and Kosfeld, 2005; Sobel,
2005). Some people are fairness-minded and many are prone to honesty regardless of the
situation (Hannan, Rankin, and Towry, 2006). Although others have preferences that are
best modeled based purely on self-interest, even self-interested people want to minimize
emotional discomfort (e.g., Elster, 1998; Dana, Cain, and Dawes, 2006). Under certain
conditions, a manager who potentially has to explain an inaccurate report may be less
prone to bias because the manager wishes to subsequently avoid feelings of guilt, shame,
regret, or other negative emotion (Scheff, 1988; 2003; Smith, Webster, Parrott, and Eyre,
2002; Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh, 2005; Connolly and Butler, 2006). Managers may be
less willing to bias earnings reports when they may have to explain their decisions and
are concerned about what investors think of them.
In their experimental examination of internal reporting, Hannan, Rankin, and
Towry (2006) conclude that a manager’s behavior is affected by the trade-off between the
benefits of honesty and those of misrepresentation. In their definition, the reports of
honest managers accurately reflect private information. Honesty benefits a manager
because it generates the trust of others and the positive feeling of self-esteem. At the
same time, misrepresentation may increase a manager’s income. Hannan, Rankin, and
Towry find that their experimental managers want to appear honest. Other research also
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suggests that managers are concerned with the appearance of honesty (Young, 1985;
Stevens, 2002).
A critical element of the reporting environment that impacts managers’ behavior
is the nature of underlying incentives: more specifically, whether knowledge of
underlying incentives enables investors to predict managers’ reporting bias. Practically
speaking, investors have some insight into managers’ incentives because proxy
statements provide details of executive compensation plans, including base salary, cash
bonuses, stock options granted, options exercised, and value realized. But, compensation
packages, including relationships between pay and performance, are often rather opaque
(Bebchuk, 2006a; 2006b). Furthermore, the link between underlying incentives and the
predictability of managers’ behavior can vary dramatically. Executive compensation
plans exhibit wide cross-section variation, which implies differences across companies in
the pay-performance relation (e.g., Kole, 1997; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Stathopoulos,
Espenlaud, and Walker, 2004).2 The structure of the compensation plan, thus, determines
the link between pay and earnings reports, which sheds light into the predictability of
managers’ reporting behavior.
For our purposes, we vary managers’ incentive scheme such that compensation is
indirectly linked to earnings reports in one treatment and directly linked in another.
Managers’ behavior is less predictable in the former and more predictable in the latter.3
We experimentally investigate whether the predictability of managers’ behavior affects

2

In addition, the level of detail included in compensation disclosures can differ considerably, which affects
investors’ knowledge of the underlying incentives and, in turn, ability to infer reporting behavior (e.g.,
Coulton, James, and Taylor, 2004; Muslu, 2005).
3
Stock options that can be exercised over a period of time provide an example of an incentive mechanism
that corresponds to the unpredictable treatment. A cash bonus tied to annual earnings, on the other hand,
provides an example of an incentive mechanism that corresponds to the predictable treatment.
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reporting bias and, in turn, investors’ ability to adapt to such behavior. As discussed
subsequently, we argue that if managers’ actions are not predictable, the opportunity to
provide an explanation for deviations in performance lessens managers’ reporting bias in
an effort to avoid negative emotions. By comparison, if the managers’ actions are
predictable, the effect of explanation on managers’ behavior is weakened. In this case,
explanation does not deter managers’ reporting bias because investors expect
performance deviations.
We find that the manager reports with an upward bias a majority of the time. The
magnitude of the bias, however, is lessened considerably when the manager’s reporting
behavior is unpredictable and the manager has an opportunity to explain inaccurate
(biased) reports. Under such conditions, the manager appears to avoid reporting
inaccurately and having to choose an explanation. We also find that investors adapt to
the manager’s behavior and anticipate that explanation dampens reporting bias.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a
framework and provide testable hypotheses. In section 3, we describe the experimental
procedures and, in section 4, present the results. Lastly, we offer concluding remarks,
provide implications for practice, and make suggestions for future research.

2. Framework
2.1 Experiment Overview
We conduct 20 experimental sessions. Each session consists of five rounds and
each round lasts four periods. Each session includes a manager and three or four
investors. At the beginning of each period, the manager privately observes a signal of the
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forecasted outcome for the period. The manager then chooses an outcome to report to
investors. Upon receiving the manager’s report, each investor predicts an outcome for
the period. The manager’s compensation, in general, is positively associated with his or
her ability to inflate investors’ predictions. By comparison, investors’ experimental
earnings are positively associated with the accuracy of their predictions. Furthermore,
each party’s incentive is common knowledge: that is, the manager knows how investors
generate experimental earnings and vice versa.
We manipulate the manager’s opportunity to explain inaccurate reports (allow
versus not allow an explanation) and the predictability of the manager’s reporting
behavior (predictable versus unpredictable) via the manager’s incentive scheme. For
predictability, we vary the link between the manager’s period-by-period compensation
and reported outcome. We conduct five sessions for each experimental group.

2.2 Participants
We recruit 93 students from a large Canadian university to participate in the
experiment. We conduct 20 sessions with four or five participants per session.4
Participants have a mean age of 21.43 years. All participants are in at least their third
year of university studies in business, with the vast majority concentrating in accounting
or finance. Students earn, on average, $43.42 (Canadian dollars) for participating 90 to
105 minutes.

4

All sessions have one manager. Seven sessions have three investors and 13 have four investors.
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2.3 Procedures
Prior to administering the experimental sessions, participants are assigned a role
(manager or investor) and told where to report. Logistically the manager arrives at one
location and investors at another. An experimenter distributes the instructions and reads
them aloud. The instructions are the same, regardless of the participant’s role, except that
the manager receives additional information on the forecasted outcome (discussed
below).
Participants are informed that the realized outcome per period is generated from a
normal distribution with a mean of 200 and a standard deviation of 50. The instructions
state that the probability the realized outcome is between 150 and 250 is 68.3 percent and
the probability it is between 100 and 300 is 95.5 percent.
At the beginning of each period, the manager receives a forecast of the firm’s
outcome.5 The realized outcome (R), announced at period end, equals the forecasted
outcome (F) plus a random error term (e). The error term is generated from a normal
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 20. The manager is informed
of the specifics of the distribution and receives forecasted and realized outcomes from ten
practice trials. Because the error term is mean zero and normally distributed, the
forecasted outcome represents the manager’s unbiased estimate of the outcome for the
period. Investors know the manager has private information on the specifics of the error
term, but nothing more.

5

The experimental instructions do not use the terms manager and investor. Rather, participants are referred
to as sender and predictor. We use generic language to avoid potential confounds introduced by
terminology.
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After receiving the forecast, the manager reports an outcome (S).6 The reported
amount cannot exceed ±20 of the forecasted outcome.7 The experimenter takes the
manager’s report to the room in which the investors are located and announces the
reported outcome. The investors then individually predict the outcome (P) for the period.
After all have recorded their prediction, the experimenter determines the median
predicted outcome (PM) and announces it publicly. In addition, the manager is informed
of the realized outcome for the period. Investors are not informed of the realized
outcome until round end.
The investors have an incentive to predict the outcome accurately. Investors’
experimental earnings per period (Inv) are computed as follows.8
Inv = constant − │P − R│,
bounded at zero from below. Hence, earnings increase as the absolute prediction error
approaches zero.
The manager, on the other hand, has an incentive to inflate investors’ expectations
of the outcome. We manipulate when it is advantageous for the manager to do so. In the
predictable treatment, the manager’s compensation per period (Mgr) is computed as
follows.
Mgr = fixed wage + (PM – F),

6

An important feature of our experiment is that the manager is an active participant, which means that
reports are determined endogenously. In previous studies, the manager’s reporting behavior is often
imposed exogenously. Because we allow the manager to be an active participant, we are able to observe
reporting behavior over time in a dynamic setting: that is, the extent that private information is reflected in
the reported outcome and whether reporting behavior changes over time
7
Investors are informed of this constraint: i.e., that the managers’ reported outcome is bounded by ±20 of
the forecasted outcome. We chose ±20 because it is 10 percent of the mean of the outcome distribution
and, under generally accepted accounting principles, amounts in excess of 10 percent are generally
considered to be material (i.e., not permissible).
8
Note that investors cannot compute their experimental earnings until round end: i.e., not until the realized
outcome per period is revealed.
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bounded at zero from below. In this case, the manager has an incentive to inflate
investors’ expectations each period: that is, to the greatest extent possible over the course
of a round.
In the unpredictable treatment, the manager’s compensation is based on only one
period per round, specified by the manager. Using the specified period, the manager’s
compensation is computed as follows.
Mgr = 4 x [fixed wage + (PM – F)].
The other three periods in the round do not affect compensation. In this case, the
manager has an incentive to inflate investor’s expectations one of four periods. In terms
of procedure, the manager is informed of the investors’ median prediction of the outcome
at period end. The manager then elects whether to choose the current period to determine
compensation. The manager may defer to a future period, but cannot return to a previous
one. Once a period is chosen, it is announced to investors at the beginning of the next
period.9
The procedures for each period within a round are similar. At the end of a round,
the manager is provided the opportunity to explain inaccurate reports in one treatment but
not the other. Inaccurate reports are defined as those that produce a difference between
the reported and realized outcome, cumulated over a round, of at least 20.10 If the
cumulative difference for the round exceeds ±20, the manager may offer an explanation.
The manager chooses from the following: apologizes for inaccurate reports, attributes
inaccurate reports to circumstances beyond control (denies blame), or remains silent

9

As mentioned earlier, the manager and investors’ incentive schemes are common knowledge.
The difference per period is signed such that a difference of +10 in one period is cancelled by −10 in
another. This approach is consistent with the reversing nature of accruals.

10
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(states that an explanation is not being provided).11 By including the three options, we
allow the manager to choose from the feasible set of explanations. The manager’s choice
is recorded and then announced to investors.
Each experimental session proceeds for five rounds or 20 periods. The number of
rounds is not announced beforehand, but participants are informed that a session will not
last longer than 120 minutes. At the conclusion of the fifth round, participants complete
a post-experiment questionnaire designed to collect demographics and elicit information
about the experiment, including assessments of the manager’s reporting behavior.
Subsequently participants are paid and dismissed.12

3. Framework
We develop a framework to consider the interactive effect of opportunity to
explain inaccurate reports and the predictability of behavior on the manager’s reporting
bias and investors’ ability to decipher such bias. The research hypotheses are developed
in the context of the experimental setting. To aid the reader, we summarize the
experimental procedures and parameters in Table 1.
Our setting is one in which the manager is motivated to inflate investors’
expectations (for at least one of four periods), which can prompt the manager to
misrepresent private information and report with bias. Prior research indicates that
11

Research in psychology is mixed concerning the most effective response. Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, and
Murnighan (2006) suggest that an apology can mitigate punishment. But the apology can backfire if it is
perceived as manipulative or insincere (Skarlicki, Folger, and Gee, 2004). Denial also can be effective in
preserving one’s standing with others, but as mentioned earlier it must be plausible (e.g., Kaplan and
Reckers, 1993; Sigal, Hsu, Foodim, and Betman, 1988; Barton and Mercer, 2004). Remaining silent may
be preferable if the other explanations cannot be conveyed credibly over time. It is beyond the scope of the
current study to empirically examine what type of explanation is most effective. But we are able to collect
data on the frequency that each type of explanation is chosen, which may facilitate future research.
12
Experimental earnings are converted to cash using a conversion rate known to participants at the
beginning of the experiment.
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misrepresentation occurs in this type of setting, particularly with information asymmetry
or an unknown other (e.g., O’Connor and Carnevale, 1997; Schweitzer and Croson, 1999;
Boles, Croson, and Murnighan, 2000).

3.1 Explanation and Reporting Behavior
We consider whether the opportunity to provide an explanation for inaccurate
reports mitigates managers’ willingness to misrepresent private information, the effect
being to lessen reporting bias. Dickhaut and McCabe (1997) contend that the act of
recording information and making it public can affect managers’ behavior. In our
treatment with explanation, if reporting inaccuracies occur the manager must choose and
record a message that is conveyed to investors. The message may include an explanation
for reporting inaccuracies (i.e., an apology or denial of blame) or it may state that an
explanation is not being sent. The act of choosing and recording the message may cause
the manager to empathize with investors and to reflect on self. Researchers have long
recognized that individuals’ actions are affected by their beliefs about how others
interpret actions, which Cooley (1922) referred to as the looking-glass self. Individual
behavior can be affected even when social interactions are anonymous (e.g., Forsythe,
Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994; Dana, Cain, and Dawes, 2006).13
In our treatment with explanation, the necessity to choose and record a message
represents a public statement that is most likely to occur when the manager misrepresents

13

An example includes experiments in which participants are asked to make a binding choice on splitting a
sum of money with another, anonymous participant (i.e., dictator games). The evidence indicates that
participants give their paired recipient more than might be expected with fully selfish preferences because
they do not want to be perceived as selfish, even though the decision is anonymous (refer to Davis and
Holt, 1993).
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private information and reports with bias.14 The manager likely perceives that such
behavior (i.e., sending a required message) is evaluated negatively by investors. In this
case, the manager’s self monitoring in relation to others (investors) can give rise to guilt,
shame, regret, or other negative emotions (Cooley, 1922; Goffman, 1967; Scheff, 1988;
Williams, 1993; Dana, Cain, and Dawes, 2006). The anticipation of a negative emotion,
even at a subconscious level, can influence behavior (e.g., Scheff, 1988; Posner and
Rasmusen, 1999; Barr, 2001; Smith, Webster, Parrott, and Eyre, 2002). Reflecting on
self, under such conditions, results in psychological discomfort and individuals prefer to
avoid such behavior (Thibodeau and Aronson, 1992; Stone and Cooper, 2001; Scheff,
1988; 1997; Larrick, 1993; Williams, 1993; Barr, 2001; Smith, Webster, Parrott, and
Eyre, 2002). Accordingly, the manager prefers to avoid choosing an explanation, all else
equal, and reacts by reporting with less bias when an explanation is allowed.
A competing factor that affects the managers’ reporting bias, and interacts with
the effect of explanation, is the predictability of the manager’s behavior. We manipulate
the predictability of reporting behavior between experimental sessions via the manager’s
compensation scheme. In half the sessions, the manager has an incentive to inflate
investors’ expectations each and every period, referred to as the predictable treatment. In
the other half, the manager has an incentive to inflate investors’ expectations in at least
one of four periods, referred to as the unpredictable treatment.

14

As noted previously (in the description of the experimental procedures), the manager knows that his or
her private information is an unbiased estimate of the realized outcome.
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3.2 Predictable Reporting Behavior
According to game theory, in the predictable treatment the manager biases the
reported outcome upward each period by the maximum allowable amount: S = F + 20
(refer to Table 1). But investors are not disadvantaged by such behavior. Rather they
anticipate the manager’s reporting bias and discount the reported outcome downward
each period: P = S – 20. Thus, the manager is unable to inflate investors’ expectations,
investors are not hurt by the manager’s actions, and investors thus are unlikely to have ill
feelings toward the manager.15 When reporting bias is predictable, the potential for
negative emotion is suppressed and the manager’s reporting behavior is unlikely to be
affected by the opportunity to provide an explanation. Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore
(2005) suggest that when conflicts of interest are honestly disclosed, making incentives
transparent and behavior predictable, individuals feel morally licensed and strategically
encouraged to exaggerate reporting bias. In this case, potential feelings of negative
emotions, associated with misrepresentations, are reduced. Likewise, Rankin, Schwartz,
and Young (2006) suggest that misrepresentation occurs in strategic settings in which
such behavior is expected and predictable. Therefore, the manager is expected to bias the
reported outcome upward in the predictable treatment, regardless of whether explanation
is allowed. We posit the following, using the superscript M to denote the managers’
reporting behavior.
H1M: If reporting behavior is predictable, the manager reports with an upward
bias.
H2M: If reporting behavior is predictable, the manager’s reporting bias is not
affected by explanation.
15

Recall that the manager’s compensation increases as the difference between the median predicted
outcome and the forecasted outcome (PM – F) increases. The investors’ compensation, on the other hand,
increases as the difference between the predicted and realized outcome (P – R) decreases.
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Investors react to the manager’s reporting behavior over the course of an
experimental session. As time progresses and realized outcomes are revealed at the end
of each round, investors gain insight into the manager’s behavior, discerning how to
anticipate and adjust for reporting bias. Dynamic models of learning suggest that
individuals adjust to factors that reinforce successful outcomes (e.g., Camerer and Ho,
1999; Capra, Goeree, Gomez, and Holt, 1999; Goeree and Holt, 2004). In essence,
investors adapt to situational factors in determining predicted outcomes each round.
When the manager’s reporting behavior is predictable, investors’ discount the reported
outcome and the adjustment is not affected by explanation. We provide the following,
using the superscript I to denote the investors’ reaction to the reported outcome.
H1I: If reporting behavior is predictable, investors adjust the reported outcome
downward.
H2I: If reporting behavior is predictable, investors’ adjustment of the reported
outcome is not affected by explanation.

3.3 Unpredictable Reporting Behavior
When the manager’s reporting behavior is unpredictable, the setting is more
complex. Backward induction implies that the manager biases the reported outcome
upward in the first period by the maximum allowable amount (S = F + 20). Such
behavior occurs because nothing can be gained from deferring the choice.16 For periods
2 – 4, the manager reports without bias (S = F). Investors’ anticipate such behavior and
react accordingly. In other words, the reported outcome is discounted by the maximum
allowable amount in the first period (P = S – 20) and taken at face value in periods 2 – 4
16

Because investors are not informed of the realized outcome per period until round end, they discount the
reported outcome by the maximum allowable amount until the manager chooses a period to determine
compensation. Accordingly, the manager is indifferent between choosing the first period or a later period
to determine compensation.
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(P = S). Although game theory prescribes equilibrium play, it is unlikely to explain
behavior in the unpredictable treatment. Foremost, backward induction fails to explain
behavior in the laboratory and significant off-equilibrium behavior typically is observed
(e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996; Johnson, Camerer,
Sen, and Rymon, 2002; Binmore, McCarthy, Ponti, Samuelson, and Shaked, 2002).
The unpredictable treatment produces much greater uncertainty for investors
(compared to the predictable treatment) – specifically in discerning the manager’s
reporting bias on a period-by-period basis. In this case, the investors are disadvantaged
relative to the manager and both parties recognize that the manager has the upper hand.
The necessity to provide an explanation for inaccurate reports evokes negative emotions
because it publicly signifies that the manager has exploited his or her position – solely for
personal gain at the expense of others (i.e., the investors). As such, the opportunity to
explain inaccurate reports likely affects the manager’s reporting behavior.
Recall that in the unpredictable treatment, the manager selects one of four periods
to determine earnings for the round, referred to as the compensation period. The manager
decides at period end whether to select the current period or defer to a future period. The
manager has an incentive to inflate investors’ expectations prior to choosing the
compensation period. Once the period is chosen and announced, the incentive
disappears. But when explanation is allowed, another incentive arises. The manager
prefers to avoid providing an explanation for inaccurate reports due to anticipated
negative emotions. In this case, subsequent reports are aimed at offsetting upward bias
reported in earlier periods (i.e., prior to selecting the compensation period). The
manager’s subsequent reports in essence expunge the upward bias reported earlier.

15
Therefore, when the manager’s behavior is unpredictable, explanation likely impacts
reporting behavior after the compensation period is selected, but not before. The
preceding discussion suggests the following hypotheses.
H3M: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, the manager reports with an upward
bias before the compensation period is chosen.
H4M: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, the manager’s reporting bias before
the compensation period is chosen is not affected by explanation.
H5M: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, the manager is more likely to report
with a downward bias after the compensation period is chosen when explanation
is allowed than not allowed.
We also provide hypotheses for the investors’ reaction that mirror those for the
managers’ reporting behavior. Investors presumably adapt over time and recognize that
reporting bias differs before and after the compensation period is chosen. Investors also
come to realize that the reported outcome must be adjusted upward after the
compensation period is chosen when explanation is allowed. The hypotheses are as
follows.
H3I: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, investors adjust the reported outcome
downward before the compensation period is chosen.
H4I: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, investors’ adjustment of the reported
outcome before the compensation period is chosen is not affected by explanation.
H5I: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, investors are more likely to adjust the
reported outcome upward after the compensation period is chosen when
explanation is allowed than not allowed.

4. Results
We examine the effect of explanation and the predictability of behavior on the
manager’s reporting behavior and investors’ reaction. We focus on two aspects: (1) the

16
difference between reported and forecasted outcome (S – F), which reflects the
manager’s reporting bias, and (2) the difference between reported outcome and investors’
median prediction (S – PM), which reflects investors’ adjustment. Initially, we examine
the manager’s reporting bias, which enables us to assess H1M – H5M. Then we turn to
investors’ adjustment, which enables us to assess H1I – H5I. In each case, we report
descriptive findings followed by formal statistical tests.

4.1 Manager’s Reporting Behavior
4.1.1. Descriptive Findings. The manager has an incentive to inflate investors’
expectations. We examine the frequency that the manager reports with an upward bias (S
> F), partitioning the data by experimental group. When behavior is predictable, the
manager reports with an upward bias over 80 percent of the time and explanation does
not appear to affect behavior (refer to Panel A of Figure 1), consistent with H1M and
H2M, respectively.
When behavior is unpredictable, explanation looks to reduce the frequency that
the manager reports with an upward bias. We partition the data by whether the
compensation period has been chosen, which is of primary interest.17 Recall that the
manager has an incentive to bias the reported outcome upward before the period is
chosen, regardless of whether explanation is allowed (refer to H3M and H4M). By

17

As mentioned earlier, game theory suggests the manager will choose the first period to determine
compensation. But the data are not consistent with this conjecture: the frequency that the first period is
chosen is only 28 percent (14 of 50). When explanation is allowed, the manager chooses period 1, 2, 3, or
4 with a frequency of ten, five, six, and four, respectively. When explanation is not allowed, the
frequencies are four, five, ten, and six, respectively. A chi-square test suggests that explanation is
associated with the manager’s decision to choose the first period as the compensation period (χ2 = 3.571, p
= 0.059, two-tailed test).
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comparison, the manager is more inclined to bias the reported outcome downward bias
after the period is chosen when explanation is allowed than not allowed (H5M).
The data indicate that before the compensation period is chosen, the manager
reports with an upward bias roughly 75 percent of the time (refer to Panel B of Figure 1),
which is consistent with H3M. In this case, explanation does not seem to affect reporting
behavior, as suggested by H4M. Once the compensation period is chosen, though,
explanation looks to impact reporting behavior. The frequency of reports with upward
bias is considerably less when explanation is allowed as opposed to not allowed (36
percent versus 71 percent). Additional inspection of the data indicates that after the
compensation period is chosen, the manager reports with a downward bias 58 percent of
the time when explanation is allowed versus 24 percent when it is not allowed, which is
supportive of H5M.18
4.1.2. Statistical Analysis. We perform a linear mixed model analysis, using
maximum likelihood estimation (see Greene, 1997, Ch. 14). The approach expands the
general linear model by allowing the data to exhibit correlated and non-constant
variability.19 The independent variables include the predictability of reporting behavior
(predictable versus unpredictable), the opportunity to explain inaccurate reports (allow
versus do not allow), and the interaction effect. The dependent variable is the manager’s

18

We also examine the type of explanation selected when one is required. When reporting behavior is
predictable, the manager chooses denial eight times, apology twice, and remains silent five times. When
reporting behavior is unpredictable, the manager chooses denial five times, apology three times, and
remains silent once. The manager’s preference for denial is consistent with archival evidence (e.g.,
Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw, McKechnie, and Puffer, 1983).
19
We investigate whether reporting bias exhibits autocorrelation or heterogeneity of variance. We find an
association between reporting bias in adjacent periods: the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at p
< 0.03 for periods 2 and 3 and periods 3 and 4. We also find evidence of heterogeneity of variance: Box’s
test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of covariance matrices across groups at p = 0.001. Accordingly,
we use an AR(1) covariance structure with heteroskedasticity in the mixed model analysis. The results
reported in the paper, though, are robust to other specifications.
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reporting bias per period (S – F), repeated over four periods per round and five rounds
per session (i.e., period and round are included as repeated measures).20
Table 2 presents the results of the mixed model analysis. The first hypothesis
(H1M) suggests that the manager reports with an upward bias when behavior is
predictable. The positive estimated marginal means (in excess of 11.0) are consistent
with H1M. Furthermore, we find that when behavior is predictable, the reporting bias is
positive in 163 of 200 periods (81.5 percent). We also cumulate the reporting bias over
the course of a round (i.e., over the four periods in a round) and find that the sum is
positive in 45 of 50 rounds (90 percent). Binomial tests confirm that the manager reports
with an upward bias a majority of the time (p < 0.001).
The second and fifth hypotheses (H2M and H5M) suggest that the effect of
explanation is contingent on the predictability of reporting behavior. The significant
interaction effect (p < 0.01), as illustrated in Panel B of Table 2, provides evidence of the
contingent relationship. Planned comparisons indicate that when the manager’s behavior
is predictable, explanation does not affect reporting behavior, consistent with H2M. By
comparison, when behavior is unpredictable, explanation has a significant effect on
reporting behavior (p < 0.01), consistent with H5M.
We further we assess the manager’s reporting behavior in the unpredictable
treatment. The third, fourth, and fifth hypotheses suggest differences before and after the
compensation period is chosen. For each session, we compute the manager’s reporting
bias before the compensation period is selected as well as afterward. Because different
periods are chosen across rounds, we compute the average reporting bias per period

20

Inferences are unaffected if we use an ex post measure of reporting bias: that is, the difference between
reported and realized outcome (S – R).
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within a round (before and after). For rounds in which the manager selects the last
period, we only compute the reporting bias before the compensation period is chosen –
there are not any periods afterward.21
The third and fourth hypotheses are concerned with reporting behavior prior to the
compensation period being chosen. In this case, the manager is expected to report with
an upward bias (H3M) and explanation is not expected to affect reporting behavior (H4M).
To assess the hypotheses, we perform a repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA). The dependent measure is the average reporting bias per period within a
round – before the compensation period is chosen. The independent variables include
explanation (allow versus not allow), round (one through five), and the interaction term.
The ANOVA results, shown in Panel A of Table 3, indicate that the intercept is
significant at p < 0.001. The average reporting bias is 7.22, 12.96, 15.60, 11.21, and
13.82 for rounds 1 – 5, respectively. Hence, the manager reports with an upward bias, on
average, prior to choosing the compensation period, which is consistent with H3M. The
insignificant main effect for explanation (p = 0.878) is consistent with H4M.
The fifth hypothesis is concerned with reporting behavior after the compensation
period is chosen. In this case, explanation is expected to affect reporting behavior: the
manager is more likely to report with a downward bias when explanation is allowed than
not allowed (H5M). The data provide 40 observations (rounds) in which we can compute
the average reporting bias after the compensation period is chosen: 21 when explanation
is allowed and 19 when not allowed. We find that the mean (median) reporting bias per
period within a round is −5.62 (−4.00) when explanation is allowed and 4.25 (4.00) when

21

The last period is selected ten times: four times when explanation is allowed and six times when it is not
allowed.
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not allowed. Parametric and nonparametric tests indicate that the difference is
statistically significant at p < 0.01, one-tailed test (t = 2.68 and z = −2.63, respectively).
We also investigate the frequency that the average reporting bias is negative, which is
indicative of the manager reporting with a downward bias after the compensation period
is chosen. As shown in Panel B of Table 3, the manager is more likely to report with a
downward bias when explanation is allowed than not allowed: 67 percent versus 21
percent (χ2 = 8.39, p = 0.004). Thus, the findings are consistent with H5M.
Lastly, to gain additional insight into the manager’s behavior, we examine the
responses to the post-experiment questionnaire. The manager is asked to characterize
reporting behavior on three ten-point scales, with endpoints labeled misleading/truthful,
selfish/altruistic, and unjust/fair. We perform three two-way analyses of variance to test
for differences between the experimental cells. In all three cases, the interaction effect
(predictability by explanation) is statistically significant at p ≤ 0.055.22 When the
manager’s behavior is unpredictable and explanation is allowed, reporting behavior is
characterized as being more truthful (mean of 6.6), more altruistic (mean of 6.2) and
fairer (mean of 7.0) as compared to the other experimental cells.23 Thus, the combination
of unpredictable behavior and allowing explanation affects the manager’s perception of
his or her reporting behavior – and perceptions appear to be reflective of actual behavior.

4.2. Investors’ Reaction
4.2.1. Descriptive Findings. Investors are aware of the manager’s incentive to
inflate their expectations and, thus, are likely to respond by adjusting the reported
22

The findings are striking because only 20 managers participated in the experiment (i.e., five per
experimental cell).
23
For the other three cells, the mean response on each scale is at least 1.8 less.
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outcome downward. We examine the frequency that the median predicted outcome is
less than the reported outcome (PM < S), partitioning the data by experimental group.
When the manager’s reporting behavior is predictable, the median adjustment is
downward about 60 percent of the time, providing weak support for H1I (refer to Panel A
of Figure 3). Moreover, explanation appears to have little affect on the frequency of
investors’ downward adjustment (59 percent when explanation is allowed versus 62
percent when not allowed), which is consistent with H2I.
When the manager’s reporting behavior is unpredictable, explanation has a
slightly more pronounced effect on investors’ reaction. We partition the data by whether
the compensation period has been chosen, which is expected to affect investors’ reaction.
Specifically, explanation is expected to affect investors’ adjustment after the
compensation period is chosen, but not before. The data indicate that before the period is
chosen, the median adjustment is downward roughly 71 percent of the time and
explanation does not appear to affect the frequency of downward adjustment, consistent
with H3I and H4I, respectively. After the compensation period is chosen, however,
investors’ adjustment differs noticeably. The frequency of downward adjustment
declines and explanation looks to have a marked effect on behavior: the frequency of
downward adjustment is 41 percent when explanation is allowed versus 59 percent when
not allowed. Further analysis indicates that after the compensation period is chosen,
investors are more likely to adjust upward when explanation is allowed than not allowed
(56 percent versus 42 percent when not allowed), consistent with H5I.
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4.2.2. Statistical Analysis. Once again we perform a linear mixed model analysis,
using maximum likelihood estimation (Greene, 1997, Ch. 14).24 The independent
variables include the predictability of behavior (predictable versus unpredictable), the
opportunity to explain inaccurate reports (allow versus do not allow), and the interaction
effect. The dependent variable is the investors’ reaction per period (PM – S), repeated
over four periods per round and five rounds per session (i.e., period and round are
included as repeated measures).
Table 4 presents the results of the mixed model analysis. The first and second
hypotheses suggest that when behavior is predictable, investors adjust the reported
outcome downward and explanation does not affect investors’ reaction. The negative
estimated marginal means (−2.5 and −5.5) are consistent with H1I. In addition, we find
that when the manager’s reporting behavior is predictable, investors’ adjustment is
negative in 121 of 200 periods (60.5 percent). We also cumulate investors’ adjustment
over the course of a round (i.e., over the four periods in a round) and find that the sum is
negative in 36 of 50 rounds (72 percent). Binomial tests confirm that investors adjust the
reported outcome downward a majority of the time (p < 0.01).
The significant effect for explanation (p = 0.055), along with the insignificant
interaction effect, is not consistent with H2I. The estimated marginal mean for investors’
adjustment is −2.12 when explanation is allowed and −4.67 when not allowed. The
findings suggest that explanation dampens investors’ adjustment, regardless of the
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As before, we examine whether investors’ reaction to the reported outcome exhibits autocorrelation or
heterogeneity of variance. We find some evidence of autocorrelation: the Pearson correlation coefficient is
significant at p < 0.10 for periods 2 and 3 and periods 3 and 4. Heterogeneity of variance, however, does
not appear to be a problem: Box’s test is unable to reject the null hypothesis of equality of covariance
matrices across groups (p > 0.50). Thus, we use an AR(1) covariance structure in the mixed model
analysis. The results reported in the paper, though, are robust to other specifications.
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predictability of the manager’s behavior. Investors appear to anticipate less reporting
bias when the manager has the opportunity to explain inaccurate reports than otherwise.
To investigate the third, fourth, and fifth hypotheses, we focus on investors’
reaction when the manager’s behavior is unpredictable. For each session, we compute
investors’ adjustment before and after the compensation period is chosen. Before the
compensation period is chosen, investors are expected to adjust the reported outcome
downward (H3I) and explanation is not expected to affect the adjustment (H4I). After the
compensation period is chosen, explanation is expected to affect investors’ adjustment:
investors are more likely to adjust the reported outcome upward when explanation is
allowed than not allowed (H5I).
To assess H3I and H4I, we perform a repeated measures ANOVA. The dependent
measure is the average investor adjustment per period within a round – before the
compensation period is chosen. The independent variables include explanation (allow
versus not allow), round (one through five), and the interaction term. The ANOVA
results, shown in Panel A of Table 5, indicate that the intercept is significant at p < 0.001.
The average investors’ adjustment is −2.60, −4.67, −4.92, −9.00, and −3.83 for rounds 1
– 5, respectively. The findings indicate that investors adjust the reported outcome
downward, on average, before the compensation period is chosen, which is consistent
with H3I. The insignificant main effect for explanation (p = 0.951) is consistent with
H4I.
To assess H5I, we examine investors’ reaction after the compensation period is
chosen, testing for differences between the explanation treatments. We find that the
mean (median) adjustment per period within a round is 5.44 (6.67) when explanation is
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allowed and −0.21 (2.00) when not allowed. We conduct parametric and nonparametric
tests and find some evidence that the adjustment is greater (and positive) when
explanation is allowed than not allowed: t = −1.92, p = 0.031, one-tailed, and z = −1.56, p
= 0.061, one-tailed. Looking at the frequency of positive adjustment on a round-byround basis, we find that the adjustment is positive a majority of the time (refer to Panel
B of Table 5). Moreover, the frequency is slightly higher when explanation is allowed
than not allowed (71 percent versus 59 percent), though the difference is not statistically
significant (χ2 = 0.80, p = 0.370). Overall, the findings suggest that explanation has a
modest effect on the magnitude of investors’ adjustment after the compensation period is
chosen, though it does not affect the direction of the adjustment. Accordingly, the results
are not entirely supportive of H5I.25
Finally, we examine investors’ responses to the post-experiment questionnaire.
Investors are asked to indicate the usefulness of the reported outcome (not useful at
all/very useful) and to characterize the manager’s reporting behavior (misleading/truthful,
selfish/altruistic, and unjust/fair). Investors respond on various ten-point scales. We
perform four two-way analyses of variances to test for differences between the
experimental groups.
For usefulness, we find that explanation has a significant effect at p = 0.077.
Investors respond that the reported outcome is more useful when explanation is allowed
than not allowed (means of 6.6. versus 5.6). For reporting behavior, the interaction effect
is significant at p ≤ 0.045 in all cases. Investors respond that the manager’s reporting
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A factor that may contribute to our findings for investor reaction is that investors do not observe the
outcome realization on a period-by-period basis (as does the manager). Rather, the outcome realizations
are observed at round end. Hence, investors are not aware of reporting bias until round end, which makes
the task much more difficult.
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behavior is more truthful (mean of 5.8), more altruistic (mean of 6.0) and fairer (mean of
6.3) when the manager behavior is unpredictable and explanation is allowed as compared
to the other experimental groups. These findings are similar to those reported earlier for
the manager.

5. Conclusion
This paper reports the results of a dynamic, multi-period experiment designed to
examine manager’s reporting behavior and investors’ reaction. We conduct 20
experimental sessions, with each session consisting of five rounds and each round lasting
four periods. The manager has an incentive, in general, to inflate investors’ expectations:
that is, to report with upward bias. Investors, on the other hand, have an incentive to
accurately predict value. We manipulate two variables between experimental sessions:
the predictability of the manager’s reporting behavior and the manager’s opportunity to
provide an explanation for inaccurate reports.
We find that the manager reports with an upward bias a majority of the time, as
may be expected. The magnitude of the bias, however, is lessened considerably when the
manager’s reporting behavior is unpredictable and the manager has an opportunity to
explain inaccurate (biased) reports. The data suggest that, under such conditions, the
manager seeks to avoid reporting inaccurately and having to choose an explanation. The
managers’ behavior in our experiment is consistent with a desire to avoid negative
emotion.
Our results provide strong support for indicated behavioral outcomes because we
report results of decision-making in an abstract setting. In naturally occurring
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environments the effect of negative emotions should be even stronger as they are
generated through direct experience.
Importantly, our findings suggest that a non-strategic factor, explanation,
significantly affects behavior. A challenge for analytical researchers is to incorporate
non-strategic factors, such as explanation, into models of reporting behavior. In a related
study, Kandel and Lazear (1992) consider how peer pressure affects incentives in an
organizational setting, including aspects of shame and guilt in the model. A similar
approach may be useful in modeling reporting behavior. We also encourage future
research to investigate other factors that may underlie the anticipation of negative
emotions and, in turn, attenuate the manager’s incentive to issue biased reports.
Our findings also suggest that investors adapt to the manager’s reporting
behavior, to some extent, and anticipate that explanation dampens reporting bias.
Interestingly, other experimental research indicates that explanation can affect users’
assessments in a one-shot setting. Barton and Mercer (2004) find that financial analysts
are more optimistic about a company’s future prospects when a plausible explanation is
offered for sub-par performance (attributing poor performance to external factors) than
not offered. Our findings suggest that simply creating the expectation that an explanation
will be provided for deviations in performance – revealed in a multi-period setting – is
enough to affect investors’ reaction to the manager’s report. When explanation is
allowed and expected, investors are more inclined to take the manager’s report at face
value (i.e., investors’ adjustment is dampened). Such behavior is adaptive when the
manager’s reporting behavior is unpredictable, because in this case reporting bias is
reduced and deviations in performance are less likely to occur. When the manager’s
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reporting behavior is predictable, however, investors’ reaction seems unfounded: in this
case explanation does not diminish reporting bias nor does it affect the occurrence of
deviations in performance.
An implication of our findings is that the structure of compensation schemes (i.e.,
the pay-performance link) and the transparency of compensation disclosures are crucial
for investors to consider in light of a manager’s explanation for sub-par performance.
We encourage archival researchers to investigate explanation along with other facets of
executive compensation to determine how investors’ welfare is affected. Such research
may be of particular interest to regulators.
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Figure 1
Manager’s Reporting Behavior
Panel A: Upward Reporting Bias – All Experimental Groups

Percent Upward Bias

100%
82% 81%

76%
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Allow Explanation
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Do Not Allow Explanation

25%
0%
Predictable

Unpredictable

Panel B: Upward Reporting Bias – Only Groups with Unpredictable Behavior

Percent Upward Bias

100%
75%

76%

74%

71%
Allow Explanation

50%
36%

Do Not Allow Explanation

25%
0%
Periods Before

Periods After

Notes: Predictable and unpredictable refer to the predictability of the manager’s
reporting behavior. Allow explanation and do not allow explanation refers to whether the
manager has the opportunity to explain inaccurate reports. Periods before and after are
based on when the manager chooses a period to determine compensation with
unpredictable behavior: that is, before or after the compensation period is chosen and
announced.

29
Figure 2
Investors’ Reaction
Panel A: Downward Adjustment – All Experimental Cells

Percent Downward Adjustment
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Panel B: Downward Adjustment –Only Cells with Unpredictable Behavior
Percent Downward Adjustment

100%
75%
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Notes: Predictable and unpredictable refer to the predictability of the manager’s reporting
behavior. Allow explanation and do not allow explanation refers to whether the manager
has the opportunity to explain inaccurate reports. Periods before and after are based on
when the manager chooses a period to determine compensation with unpredictable
behavior: that is, before or after the compensation period is chosen and announced.
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Table 1
Experimental Setting
Panel A: Experimental Procedures
Beginning of experimental session
1. All participants are informed of the distribution used to generate the realized outcome.
2. The manager is endowed with information on the distribution of the error term (e) used
to generate the forecasted outcome.
Each period
1. The manager observes the forecasted outcome (F).
2. The manager chooses the reported outcome (S).
3. The investors observe the reported outcome and individually predict the outcome (P).
4. The manager is informed of the realized outcome (R).
5. The manager and investors are informed of the median predicted outcome (PM).
6. For the unpredictable treatment, the manager decides whether to choose the current
period to determine compensation. Once a period is chosen, it is announced to the
investors.
End of round
1. The investors are informed of the realized outcome for the four periods.
2. If an explanation is allowed, the manager chooses an explanation when reporting
inaccuracies, cumulated over the course of a round, exceed a threshold.
3. The manager and investors compute their experimental earnings.
Panel B: Experimental Parameters
Manager’s compensation per period (Mgr)
Predictable Treatment
Unpredictable Treatment
Investor’s compensation per period (Inv)
Realized outcome
Forecasted outcome
Error term associated with forecast
Manager’s reporting threshold
Threshold for providing an explanation

Mgr = 15 + (PM − F), bounded below at 0
Mgr = 4 x [15 + (PM − F)] or 0, where the
manager chooses one period to determine
compensation for the round
Inv = 35 – |P – R|, bounded below at 0
N(200,50)
F=R+e
e ∼ N(0,20)
F − 20 ≤ S ≤ F + 20
4

4

t =1

t =1

∑ (S − R) > 20 or ∑ (S − R) < −20
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Table 2
Manager’s Reporting Behavior: All Experimental Groups

Panel A: Mixed Model Analysis Results
Source
Intercept
Predictability
Explanation
Interaction

F-statistic
175.10
8.03
10.21
7.36

P-value
0.000
0.005
0.002
0.008

Panel B: Estimated Marginal Means

Estimated Marginal Mean

15
Predictable
10

5

Unpredictable

0
Allow Explanation

Do Not Allow Explanation

Notes: The mixed model analysis assumes an AR(1) covariance structure with
heteroskedasticity for the random effects, though the results are robust to other
specifications. Predictability refers to the predictability of the manager’s reporting
behavior (predictable versus unpredictable). Explanation refers to whether the manager
has an opportunity to explain inaccurate reports (allow versus do not allow).
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Table 3
Manager’s Reporting Behavior: Unpredictable Treatment

Panel A: Repeated Measures ANOVA Results Before the Compensation Period is Chosen
Within-Subject Effects
Round
Round x Explanation
Between-Subject Effects
Intercept
Explanation

F-statistic
1.77
0.57

P-value
0.159
0.687

82.35
0.03

0.000
0.878

Panel B: Frequency of Downward Bias After the Compensation Period is Chosen
Explanation
Not Allowed
Allowed
Chi-Square Test

Reporting Bias
Otherwise
Downward
(Bias < 0)
(Bias ≥ 0)
4
15
14
7
2
χ = 8.39, p = 0.004

Notes: The dependent measure in the repeated measures ANOVA is the average reporting
bias per period within a round, computed using periods before the compensation period is
chosen. Round refers to the round in the experimental session (one through five).
Explanation refers to whether the manager has an opportunity to explain inaccurate
reports (allow versus do not allow).
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Table 4
Investors’ Reaction: All Experimental Groups

Panel A: Mixed Model Analysis Results
Source
Intercept
Predictability
Explanation
Interaction

F-statistic
26.58
0.84
3.76
0.91

P-value
0.000
0.361
0.055
0.764

Panel B: Estimated Marginal Means
Allow Explanation

Do Not Allow Explanation

Estimated Marginal Means

0
Unpredictable

-5

Predictable

-10

Notes: The mixed model analysis assumes an AR(1) covariance structure for the random
effects, though the results are robust to other specifications. Predictability refers to the
predictability of the manager’s reporting behavior (predictable versus unpredictable).
Explanation refers to whether the manager has an opportunity to explain inaccurate
reports (allow versus do not allow).
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Table 5
Investors’ Reaction: Unpredictable Treatment

Panel A: Repeated Measures ANOVA Before the Compensation Period is Chosen
Within-Subject Effects
Round
Round x Explanation
Between-Subject Effects
Intercept
Explanation

F-statistic
1.64
0.17

P-value
0.189
0.951

14.37
0.00

0.005
0.951

Panel B: Frequency of Upward Adjustment After the Compensation Period is Chosen
Explanation
Not Allowed
Allowed
Chi-Square Test

Investors’ Adjustment
Upward
Otherwise
(Bias > 0)
(Bias ≤ 0)
11
8
15
6
χ2 = 0.80, p = 0.370

Notes: The dependent measure in the repeated measures ANOVA is the average
investors’ adjustment per period within a round, computed using periods before the
compensation period is chosen. Round refers to the round in the experimental session
(one through five). Explanation refers to whether the manager has an opportunity to
explain inaccurate reports (allow versus do not allow).
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